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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, an explosion aboard the “Deepwater
Horizon”—an oil drilling rig operating on the British Petroleum
Exploration & Production, Inc., (“BP”) owned “Macondo
Prospect”—caused the worst oil spill in U.S. history.1 Over
3,000,000 barrels of oil were spilled, and eleven people were
killed.2
The environmental damage was catastrophic.3
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Naturally, lawsuits were filed, including In re Deepwater
Horizon,4 a class action filed against BP and others for damages
arising from the infamous oil spill.5 The district court certified
the class and approved a settlement agreement that was
reached.6 On appeal, BP and others challenged the district
court’s decision to certify the class and approve the settlement
agreement.7
The crux of the appellants’ argument was that the class
should have never been certified because it included
unidentified members and members who incurred no injury as
a result of the spill.8 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court has never—
at least not in a majority opinion—explicitly addressed the issue
of whether putative, unnamed class members in a class action
lawsuit must prove standing before class certification.9
However, in Lewis v. Casey,10 Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer, in their concurring and dissenting opinion, explained
that, in the context of standing and class action certification,
“[u]nnamed plaintiffs need not make any individual showing
of standing in order to obtain relief, because the standing issue
focuses on whether the plaintiff is properly before the court, not
whether represented parties or absent class members are
properly before the court.”11
The Fifth Circuit recognized that a minority of
jurisdictions relied on this opinion when they formulated their
rule regarding the present issue.12 The court also examined
cases involving application of the majority rule, which the court
characterized as “ensur[ing] that absent class members possess
Article III standing by examining the class definition.”13
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in Denney, other
739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014).
See generally id.
6 Id. at 795.
7 Id. at 798-99.
8 See In re Deepwater Horizon.
9 In re Deepwater Horizon at 798-99.
10 518 U.S. 343, 395-96 (1996).
11 In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 800 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S
at 395-96).
12 Id. at 800-01.
13 Id. at 801 (citing Denney, 443 F.3d at 262).
4
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circuits have followed suit, requiring classes to be defined in
such a way that nobody within the class—named or
unnamed—would lack standing.14 Ultimately, after looking at
both the majority and minority rule, and declining to
specifically adopt either one, the court held that the class
possessed standing under either standard.15
As explained by the Fifth Circuit in In re Deepwater
Horizon, currently the federal circuits are split on whether
putative unnamed class members in a class action lawsuit must
possess standing.16 The majority of circuits hold that a class
action lawsuit cannot be certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 if the class contains members who lack standing.17
A minority of circuits hold that unnamed putative class
members need not establish standing; rather, the “cases or
controversies” requirement is satisfied so long as a class
representative has standing.18 The United States Supreme
Court has yet to definitively resolve the issue, and scholars are
similarly divided over whether the majority or minority
approach is proper.19
In addition to describing the differences between Article
III standing and class certification under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Part II, Part III provides an updated account
of the circuit split.20 Part IV of this article argues that the
minority rule is compelled by recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence and is consistent with the purpose of class action
devices.21 First, Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lewis v. Casey
supports the proposition that the minority rule—that putative
unnamed class members need not establish standing—is

Id.
Id. at 802-05.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part III.a.
18 See infra Part III.b.
19 Compare Joshua P. Davis, et. al., The Puzzle of Class Actions with
Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, (2014) (contending
that the minority rule is correct), with Theane Evangelis, Bradkey J.
Hamburger, Article III Standing and Absent Class Members, 64 EMORY
L. J. 384 (arguing in favor of the majority rule).
20 See infra Parts II-III.
21 See infra Part IV.
14
15
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correct.22 Second, the Court’s decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo not to address the issue of whether a class can be
certified when absent class members lack standing—even
though this issue was raised by the petitioner—suggests that
only named plaintiffs need establish standing.23 This is because
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Court has an
obligation to address standing, even if the issue was not raised
by the parties, if the lower court possessed no jurisdiction over
the case.24 Finally, Part V argues that the purpose of the class
action device—judicial efficiency—is furthered by the minority
rule.25 In contrast, the broad rule will result in unnecessary
prosecution of separate actions by individual class members.26

II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ARTICLE III STANDING AND
CLASS CERTIFICATION
A. CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
A class action lawsuit is a suit where a plaintiff – or
multiple plaintiffs – represents many individuals where it is
efficient to do so.27 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that, before a class action may proceed, a judge must

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 See infra Part V.
26 See infra Part V.
27 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,10th ed.
2014) (A class action lawsuit is a suit where “the convenience either
of the public or of the interested parties requires that the case be
settled through litigation by or against only a part of the group of
similarly situated persons and in which a person whose interests are
or may be affected does not have an opportunity to protect his or her
interests by appearing personally or through a personally selected
representative, or through a person specially appointed to act as a
trustee or guardian.”); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
700-01 (1979) (a class action suit is an “exception to the usual rule
that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named
parties only.”).
22
23
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“certify” the class.28 For certification, several requirements
must be met.29 First, under Rule 23(a), a party may sue as a
representative plaintiff only if: (1) joining all members would
be impracticable because of the number of class members; (2)
the class has common questions of law or fact; (3) the
representatives have claims or defenses typical of those of the
class; and (4) the interests of the class would be protected by the
representatives.30 Next, one of the requirements in Rule 23(b)
must be met, specifically (1) separate actions would create a risk
of inconsistent or varying adjudications or would be dispositive
of non-party interests or substantially impair the ability to
protect their interests; (2) injunctive relief or declaratory relief
is appropriate; or (3) questions of law or fact predominate over
questions affecting individual members and a class action is
superior to other available methods.31 If Rule 23(a) and (b) are
both satisfied, a judge may certify the class.32 However, “[t]he
Supreme Court has required district courts to conduct a
‘rigorous analysis’ into whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 are
met before certifying a class.”33
To illustrate, in the case of In re American Medical
Systems, Inc.,34 a subsidiary of Pfizer, American Medical
Systems (“AMS”), created certain prosthetics.35
The
representative plaintiff,Paul Vorhis, was injured by a prosthesis
manufactured by AMS, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, alleging, among other claims,
negligence, breach of warranties, and strict products liability.36
In its brief in opposition to Vorhis’ motion for certification, AMS
argued that: (1) Vorhis would not adequately protect the
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
33 In re American Medical Systems, Inc. 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (1996)
(citing General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). “The trial
court has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, but
that discretion must be exercised within the framework of Rule 23.”
In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d at 1079.
34 75 F.3d 1069 (1996).
35 Id. at 1074.
36 Id.
28
29
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interests of other class members because his psychiatric
condition rendered him irrational; (2) Vorhis’ claim was not
typical of that of other class members because his problems
with the prosthesis arose from his unique health conditions;
and (3) Vorhis only had issues with one type of prosthesis; thus,
he could not represent other class members who had problems
with the other types of prostheses manufactured by AMS.37
In response, Vorhis’ psychiatrist testified that, despite
his conditions, Vorhis was competent to withstand trial.38
Vorhis also argued that even though he only had issues with
one of the prostheses, the designs of the others were basically
the same; thus, he could fairly represent other class members
who had issues with the different models.39 The district court
judge issued an order which conditioned class certification on
Vorhis amending his complaint to add other representative
plaintiffs to the case.40 The order appeared to stem from the
judge’s concerns about the ability of Vorhis to fairly represent
the class.41 After Vorhis amended his complaint to add more
representative plaintiffs, the court certified the class.42 The
defendants filed a writ of mandamus with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, seeking to vacate the district
court’s decision to certify Vorhis’ action.43
The Sixth Circuit first noted that a class may not be
certifiable simply because the pleadings say it is so.44
According to the court, “[t]here must be an adequate statement
of the basic facts to indicate that each requirement of the rule is
fulfilled.”45 This burden lies with the party moving for class
certification.46 Next, the court discussed the first element
required for certification—that the class be numerous so as to
Id. at 1075.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1075-76.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 1076.
43 Id. at 1077.
44 Id. at 1079 (citing Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 571
(6th Cir. 1970)).
45 Id. at 1079 (quoting Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197,
1200 (6th Cir. 1974)).
46 Id. at 1079.
37
38
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render joinder impracticable—and noted that this element was
easily met.47 Indeed, the district court found that the number of
class members could be anywhere between 15,000 and
120,000.48 Nor did defendants dispute that this element was
satisfied.49
Second, the court addressed the “commonality”
requirement in Rule 23(a).50 In order to satisfy this element,
there must be issues of law or fact common to all members of
the class.51 The court held that this element was not satisfied.52
The court reasoned that, because Vorhis’ complaint contained
conclusory allegations regarding the types of injuries that each
class member suffered, and because the defendants proffered
uncontradicted evidence showing that class members would
have different injuries because of the different prosthetics used
(and thus different proofs would be required for each claim),
the commonality requirement was not satisfied.53 Although
lack of commonality would be enough to render the district
court’s certification order faulty, the Sixth Circuit also
explained that the “typicality” element was not satisfied
because the representative plaintiffs had not used all the models
that other class members used.54 The court also found that the
district court failed to consider whether Vorhis would
adequately and fairly represent the interests of the other class
members.55

B. ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIREMENTS
In comparison, “standing” typically must be met in
every case, and its requirements are derived not only from the

Id.
Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1080.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1082.
53 See id. at 1080-82.
54 Id. at 1080-83.
55 Id. at 1080-83.
47
48
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Constitution, but also prudential concerns.56 Article III’s case
or controversy language requires litigants to show that they
have suffered an “injury-in-fact”, that the injury is “fairly
traceable” to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury
will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.57 The first step
is to determine whether plaintiffs have satisfied the “injury-infact” requirement. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, and must
clearly allege facts satisfying each element.58 To establish an
“injury-in-fact”, a plaintiff must prove the “‘invasion of a
legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’
and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”59 An
injury is “particularized” if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way.”60 A “concrete” injury means
that the injury must actually exist.61 The next step is determine
whether the injury is caused by the defendant’s unlawful
actions and is redressable by the court.62 If these elements are
satisfied, the plaintiff has standing.

III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The federal circuits are currently split on whether
putative unnamed class members in a class action lawsuit must
possess standing.63 The majority of circuits hold that a class
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (articulating a
prudential limitation on standing—i.e. the prohibition against
generalized grievances).
57 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Spokeo v. Robbins,
136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in
the traditional understanding of a case or controversy. The doctrine
developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not exceed
their authority as it has been traditionally understood.”).
58 Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1545.
59 Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan 504 U.S. at 560).
60 Id. (quoting 504 U.S. at 560, n.1).
61 Id.
62 See e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 727, 751 (1984).
63 Compare Denney v. Deutsche Bank, 443 F.3d 253, 263-64 (2d Cir.
2006) (standing required), and Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,, 666
F.3d 581, 594 (9th 2011) (standing required), and Halvorson v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2013) (standing required),
56
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action lawsuit cannot be certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 if the class contains members who lack standing.64
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits reason that standing is an irreducible
constitutional minimum that must always be met.65 Thus, a
class must be defined in such a way that all class members
would possess standing (the “majority rule”).66 In contrast, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and
Seventh Circuits each hold that unnamed putative class
members need not establish standing; rather, the “cases or
controversies” requirement is satisfied so long as a class
representative has standing (the “minority rule”).67 The United
States Supreme Court has yet to explicitly resolve the issue.

A. THE MAJORITY RULE
The Second Circuit was the first circuit to address the
issue of putative unnamed class members and standing. In
Denney v. Deutsche Bank, the representative plaintiffs alleged
that Deutsche Bank and other defendants had engaged in
“improper and fraudulent tax counseling.”68 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that they were misled by defendants about the
legal validity of certain tax strategies—which were created and
marketed by defendants—involving the purchase of foreign

and In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.-MDL. No. 1869,
725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (standing required), with Kohen v.
Pacific Inv. Mgmt Co., LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009)
(standing not required), and Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794
F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 2015) (standing not required), and
AstraZenecaAstrazeneca AB v. UFCW (In re Nexium Antitrust
Litig.), 777 F.3d 9, 25 (1st. Circ. 2015) (standing not required).
64 Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson, 718
F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252.
65 See Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson,
718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252.
66 See Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson,
718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252.
67 Kohen, 571 F.3d at 676; Neale, 794 F.3d at 363; UFCW, 777 F.3d at
25.
68 443 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2006).
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currency options.69 Ultimately, a settlement was reached
between the parties and was approved by the district court.70
The court also certified the class pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.71 The defendants and one group of
plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order approving the final
settlement and certifying the class.72 The appellants argued—
inter alia—that class certification was improper because the
class included two groups of persons who did not have Article
III standing.73
First, the Second Circuit noted that, even though the
district court did not expressly address the issue of standing
raised by appellants, the court must “consider any standing
issue, as it speaks to [the court’s] jurisdiction over th[e]
action.”74 The court explained that standing is a threshold
question in every case—and it does not matter whether the suit
is filed as a class action or not.75 Second, the court stated that
each member of the class need not submit evidence of personal
standing;76 however, “[t]he class must therefore be defined in
such a way that anyone within it would have standing.”77
With this new rule, the court analyzed whether the two
groups within the plaintiff’s class possessed standing.78 The
Id. at 259.
Id. at 261.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 262.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 263, n.3 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,
230-31 (1990)).
75 Id. at 263 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
76 Id. at 263-64. This is because represented members in a class action
are “passive members,” and the issue of standing focuses on
whether the Plaintiff is rightfully before the court. Id. (citing HERBERT
B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.7 (4th
ed. 2002)).
77 Id. at 264.
78 Id. at 263. The court also recognized the familiar rule that in order
to determine standing, the court “‘must accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in
favor of the complaining party’ (i.e., the class members).” See id.
(quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.)
69
70
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appellants argued that two groups of persons within the
plaintiff’s class did not suffer an “injury in fact” because they
were “future risk” plaintiffs.79 The first group had not yet been
audited by the Internal Revenue Service and the second group
never received an opinion by defendants affirming the legal
validity of the tax strategy.80 The court rejected the appellants’
argument.81
First, the court reasoned that there is a difference
between a “legal interest” and the concept of “injury-in-fact”:
[A]n injury-in-fact need not be capable of
sustaining a valid cause of action under
applicable tort law. An injury-in-fact may
simply be the fear or anxiety of future harm. For
example, exposure to toxic or harmful
substances has been held sufficient to satisfy the
Article III injury-in-fact requirement even
without physical symptoms of injury caused by
the exposure, and even though exposure may
not provide sufficient ground for a claim under
state tort law.82
Second, the so-called “future risk” plaintiffs suffered “injuries
in fact” because, according to the allegations in the complaint,
they were given fraudulent tax counseling, relied on said
counseling, and suffered harm because of it.83 The court
explained that the other elements of standing were also met
because the plaintiff’s class was “limited to persons who
received and took actions in reliance on the allegedly
fraudulent or negligent tax advice provided by defendants, and
the asserted injuries-in-fact were a direct result of that
reliance.”84
Next, in Mazza v. Am. Honda,85 plaintiffs brought a class
action lawsuit against American Honda Motor Company.86 The
Id. at 264.
Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 264-65 (citing Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
83 Id. at 265.
84 Id. at 266.
85 666 F.3d 581 (9th 2011).
86 Id. at 585.
79
80
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plaintiffs alleged that Honda violated California’s Unfair
Competition Law (“UCL”) when its advertisements
misrepresented the qualities of certain braking systems
contained within Acura RLs.87 Honda appealed the district
court’s decision to certify the class action lawsuit, arguing—
among other things—that the class included members who did
not suffer an “injury in fact” because, under California’s UCL,
“restitution is available to class members without
individualized proof of deception, reliance, or injury.”88
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit court
disagreed with Honda’s standing argument.89 First, the court
explained that “no class may be certified that contains members
lacking Article III standing.”90 Next, because of Honda’s
deceptive advertising, plaintiffs’ class members paid more than
they otherwise would have paid.91 Thus, the court held, “[t]o
the extent that class members were relieved of their money by
Honda's deceptive conduct—as Plaintiffs allege—they have
suffered an ‘injury in fact.’”92 Notably, the Ninth Circuit
deviated from its prior decision, Stearns, which followed the
minority rule; however, it did not expressly overrule Stearns.93
The Eighth Circuit also followed the majority rule in
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.94 In Halvorson, plaintiffs sued
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, alleging that the company
failed to exercise good faith when the company breached its
personal
injury
protection
insurance
policy
with
95
policyholders. The class members included all policyholders
in the states of Minnesota and North Dakota who submitted
claims for medical expenses under their policies and received
less than their policies allowed.96 Specifically, plaintiffs took
Id.
Id. at 595 (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 320, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 559, 207, P.3d 20 (Cal. 2009)).
89 Id. at 594.
90 Id. (citing Denney, 443 F.3d at 264).
91 Id. at 595 (quoting Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013,
1021 (9th Cir. 2011)).
92 Id.
93 Compare id at 594, with Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1021.
94 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2013).
95 Id. at 774.
96 Id.
87
88
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issue with Auto-Owners’ method for calculating and paying
out an individual policyholder’s claim.97
Auto-Owners
appealed the district court’s decision to certify plaintiff’s class
from North Dakota, arguing that certification was improper
because individual questions predominated over common
questions and certain class members lacked standing.98
The court accepted both of Auto-Owners’ arguments.99
First, the court noted that, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), a “class action may be maintained if
‘questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.’”100 According to the court, in the present case
“the individual questions necessary to determine breach of
contract and bad faith include whether a provider's charge was
usual and customary and, thus, whether the claim payment was
reasonable.”101 Because these individual questions would
predominate over the larger question of whether Auto-Owners
processed claims in bad faith, F.R.C.P. 23(B)(3) is not satisfied.102
Finally, the court explained that some members of
plaintiff’s class would, by definition, not have standing because
they did not suffer any damages.103 The court distinguished
plaintiff’s case from In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig.,104
a case involving a class action lawsuit based on a defendant’s
alleged violation of a statute.105 In Zurn, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found standing even though
certain members of the class did not suffer any damages.106
Unlike Zurn, the plaintiffs in Halvorson were not relying on the
defendant’s alleged violation of a statute conferring upon them

Id. at 775.
Id. at 778.
99 Id. at 780.
100 Id. at 778 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
101 Id. at 779.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 644 F.3d 604, 630 (8th Cir. 2011).
105 Halvorson, 718 F.3d 773, 779 (citing Zurn, 644 F.3d at 630).
106 Id. at 779.
97
98
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a right to sue.107 Thus, the court found that lack of standing was
another reason to overrule the district court’s decision to certify
plaintiff’s class.108
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
is the last circuit to follow the majority rule. In re Rail Freight
Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation109 involved a class action
lawsuit—consisting primarily of parties utilizing several
railroads for freight shipment—filed against the railroads,
alleging that they had engaged in a “price-fixing conspiracy”
by imposing fuel surcharges on shipments, which allegedly
violated certain antitrust laws.110 The district court certified the
class, despite the fact that it contained members who suffered
no injury.111 In part, the district court relied on the Fifth
Circuit’s reasoning regarding absent class members and class
standing.112 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that
the plaintiffs needed to show that all class members suffered an
injury-in-fact.113 The court reasoned that if the plaintiffs did not
make such a showing, “individual trials [would be] necessary
to establish whether a particular shipper suffered harm from
the price-fixing scheme.”114

B. THE MINORITY RULE
The Seventh, Third, and First Circuits are the only
circuits to deviate from the majority rule. First, in Kohen v.
Pacific Mgmt Co.,115 a class action lawsuit was filed by
purchasers of certain futures contracts against a group of
defendants, Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC
(PIMCO), for allegedly violating the Commodity Exchange Act
by “cornering the market.”116 PIMCO appealed the district
See id.
Id. at 779-80.
109 725 F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
110 Id. at 247.
111 Id. at 255.
112 See id. at 255 (quoting Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677).
113 Id. at 252.
114 Id.
115 571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009).
116 Id. at 674-75.
107
108
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court’s certification of plaintiff’s class, arguing that it was error
for the judge not to determine which class members suffered
damages.117 Judge Richard Posner rejected PIMCO’s argument,
holding that Article III’s standing requirement is met if the class
representative has standing.118 Posner explained:
If the case goes to trial, this plaintiff may fail to
prove injury. But when a plaintiff loses a case
because he cannot prove injury the suit is not
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
established at the pleading stage by a claim of
injury that is not successfully challenged at that
stage is not lost when at trial the plaintiff fails to
substantiate the allegation of injury; instead the
suit is dismissed on the merits. Pressed at
argument, PIMCO's counsel retreated, conceded
or at least seemed to concede that the issue was
not jurisdictional, and clarified that his
argument was only that the class members
lacked ‘statutory standing.’ Then he took back
his concession, arguing that if any class member
were found not to have sustained damages, the
court would have no jurisdiction over that class
member, who would therefore not be bound by
any judgment or settlement and so could bring
his own suit for damages. That is to say that if a
plaintiff loses his case, this shows that he had no
standing to sue and therefore can start over. That
would be an absurd result, and PIMCO need not
fear it.119
Next, in AstraZeneca AB v. UFCW (In re Nexium Antitrust
Litigation),120 class action plaintiffs—certain union funds—sued
defendant drug manufacturers and others, alleging patent and
antitrust violations.121 A federal district court certified the class
even though the class, by definition, contained members who

Id. at 676.
Id.
119 Id. at 677 (internal citations omitted).
120 777 F.3d 9 (1st. Cir. 2015).
121 Id. at 13-15.
117
118
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had suffered no “injury-in-fact”.122 The defendants appealed
the certification decision, which the First Circuit reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.123 The defendants
argued that because the class included members who had not
been injured, the class lacked Article III standing.124 The First
Circuit disagreed.125 The court concluded that, because the
named plaintiffs proved standing, the class therefore had
standing.126
Finally, in Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC,127 plaintiffs
filed a class action against Volvo Cars of North America, LLC,
and others, for the sale of allegedly defective vehicles.128 The
district court certified plaintiff’s class, which included
purchasers of the allegedly defective vehicle within six states.129
Volvo appealed the district court’s decision to certify the class,
arguing that the class contained putative, unnamed members
who lacked standing.130
Ultimately, the Third Circuit
remanded the case back to the district court; however, it
rejected Volvo’s standing argument.131
The Third Circuit held that “unnamed, putative class
members need not establish Article III standing. Instead, the
‘cases or controversies’ requirement is satisfied so long as a
class representative has standing, whether in the context of a
settlement or litigation class.”132 First, the court reasoned that
this holding was compelled by its prior decision, In re Prudential
Insurance Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions,133
Id. at 14, 17 (this is because several of the class members would
have continued to purchase the brand name drug even if the generic
brand was on the market).
123 Id. at 17.
124 Id. at 31.
125 Id. at 32.
126 Id. (“The named plaintiffs thus have standing to sue for their
injuries and to request, under Rule 23(b)(3), that the court allow
them to represent and secure a judgment on behalf of a class.”).
127 794 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2015).
128 Id. at 356.
129 Id. at 357.
130 Id. at 358.
131 Id. at 358, 375.
132 Id. at 362.
133 148 F.3d 283, 290-92 (3d Cir. 1998).
122
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where the Third Circuit held that only the named
representative plaintiff in a settlement class needs to establish
standing.134
The difference between the two cases was that Neale
involved a litigation class, whereas Prudential involved a
settlement class.135 Second, the court examined the history of
representative lawsuits—including class action suits—and
explained that “a class action is a representative action brought
by a named plaintiff or plaintiffs. Named plaintiffs are the
individuals who seek to invoke the court's jurisdiction and they
are held accountable for satisfying jurisdiction.”136 Thus, only
the named class plaintiff need establish Article III standing.137

IV. ARTICLE III IS SATISFIED SO LONG AS THE CLASS
REPRESENTATIVE HAS STANDING
In O’Shea v. Littleton,138 a § 1983 class action lawsuit was
filed against certain officials in Alexander County, Illinois.139
The plaintiffs alleged that the officials engaged in
unconstitutional conduct with respect to the administration of
criminal justice.140 However, none of the representative
plaintiffs, at the time the suit was initiated, suffered any
injury.141 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
Article III standing.142 The Court reasoned that “if none of the
named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the
requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none
may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the
class.”143 Left unanswered was the question of whether

Neale, 794 F.3d at 363 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 290-92).
Compare id. at 357, with Prudential, 148 F.3d at 290-92.
136 Neale, 794 F.3d at 363-64.
137 Id. at 364.
138 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
139 O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 490-91.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 495-96.
142 Id. at 493.
143 Id. at 494 (citing Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33, (1962)
(emphasis added)).
134
135
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putative, unnamed class members must establish Article III
standing.144
The lower courts are sharply divided over the question
left unanswered in O’Shea.145 At minimum, four circuits adhere
to the majority rule, which requires all class members to possess
standing as a prerequisite for class certification.146 Three
circuits follow the minority rule, requiring only that the named
class representative needs to demonstrate standing.147 This
article argues that the minority rule is correct because it is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tyson v.
Bouaphakeo148 and Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lewis v.
Casey.149
The purpose of class action devices—judicial
efficiency—is also served by the minority rule.150

A. THE MINORITY RULE IS COMPELLED BY SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
i. LEWIS V. CASEY

1. BACKGROUND
Lewis v. Casey151 involved a class action lawsuit filed by
inmates in prisons run by the Arizona Department of
Corrections (“ADOC”).152
The inmates alleged that the
petitioners violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Bounds v.
Smith,153 where the Court held that “‘the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
See id. at 494.
See supra Part III.
146 Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson,
718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252.
147 Kohen, 571 F.3d at 676; Neale, 794 F.3d at 363; UFCW, 777 F.3d at
25.
148 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
149 518 U.S. 343 (1996). See infra Part IV.a., b.
150 See infra Part IV.c.
151 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
152 Id. at 346.
153 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
144
145

DOES ARTICLE III REQUIRE PUTATIVE UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING?

97

meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law.’”154
Specifically, the inmates alleged that their
Constitutional rights were violated because the petitioners did
not adequately train law library staff, legal materials were not
updated, illiterate and non-English speaking prisoners did not
receive legal assistance, and prisoners in solitary confinement
were denied access to the prison law libraries.155
The district court below found in favor of the inmates
and granted a permanent injunction against the petitioners.156
Among other things, the injunction required the prisons to
drastically increase prisoners’ access to the law library and legal
materials within the library and mandated the training of legal
assistance for non-English speaking and illiterate prisoners.157
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
district court exceeded its authority when it granted the
permanent injunction after it found that petitioners violated the
Court’s holding in Bounds.158 The petitioners argued that (1) the
district court erred when it found that petitioners violated
Bounds, and (2) the district court’s finding of individual injuries
did not warrant the broad injunction.159
The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia,
started with the proposition that a violation of Bounds requires
a plaintiff to allege an injury-in-fact, which is also an essential
requirement for Article III standing.160 Next, the court
disagreed with respondents’ interpretation of Bounds. First, the
court explained that the decision in Bounds did not establish the
expansive right that respondents wished it did—instead,
Bounds was a narrow decision simply establishing prisoners’
right of access to the courts.161 Second, Bounds did not impose
an affirmative duty on prisons to establish specific conditions
favorable to prisoners; rather, to establish a Bounds violation, a
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828).
Id. at 346-47.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 347-48.
158 Id. at 348.
159 Id. at 348-49.
160 Id. at 349.
161 Id. at 350, (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, 821, 828)
154
155
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plaintiff must show “that the alleged shortcomings in the
library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to
pursue a legal claim.”162
With this new formulation of Bounds, the Court
examined the district court’s finding of injuries and decision to
grant a broad, permanent injunction.163 First, the Court noted
that the district court found that at least two prisoners suffered
injuries because of ADOC’s policies: one inmate—a slow
reader—had a case dismissed with prejudice and another
inmate was unable to file a legal action.164 Notably, in dicta, the
Court stated that “[t]he general allegations of the complaint in
the present case may well have sufficed to claim injury by
named plaintiffs, and hence standing to demand remediation .
. . ;” however, whether these injuries justified the district court’s
broad injunction was another question entirely.165 This is
because “[t]he remedy must of course be limited to the
inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has
established.”166 Finally, the Court concluded that the district
court’s finding of two individual injuries was wholly
inadequate to support the broad injunction.167
Justice Thomas joined the majority’s narrowing of
Bounds and its conclusion that the district court below exceeded
its authority when it issued the injunction.168 However, Justice
Thomas wrote that the majority did not go far enough with its
position on Bounds—because, according to Justice Thomas,
while the right of access to the courts is valid, there is “no basis
in the Constitution – and …Bounds cited none – for …the right
Id. at 351 (“He might show, for example, that a complaint he
prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical
requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal
assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had
suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the
courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he
was unable even to file a complaint.”).
163 Id. at 356-57.
164 Id. at 357-58.
165 Id. at 357.
166 Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88, 89 (1995)).
167 Id. at 359-60 (citing Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,
417 (1977); Califano, 442 U.S. at 702).
168 Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring).
162
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to have the government finance the endeavor.”169 Further, the
district court’s decision, according to Justice Thomas, was just
another example of the federal judiciary’s overreach, which is
antithetical to principles of separation of powers and
federalism.170
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer,
concurred with the majority’s judgment to the extent that the
district court was not justified—based on its factual findings of
injury—in granting the permanent injunction.171 Specifically,
Justice Souter acknowledged that the district court’s finding
that the prisons generally had complete libraries did not
support the broad injunction, which, among other things,
“imposed detailed rules and requirements upon each of the
State's prison libraries, including rules about library hours,
supervision of prisoners within the facilities, request forms,
educational and training requirements for librarians and their
staff members, prisoners' access to the stacks, and inventory.”172
Justice Souter disagreed, however, with several of the
majority’s statements regarding standing.173 First, Justice
Souter noted that, because the majority acknowledged that at
least one class representative had standing, awarding classwide relief did not require a showing that “some or all of the
unnamed class could themselves satisfy the standing
requirements for named plaintiffs.”174 Justice Souter explained:
[Unnamed plaintiffs] need not make any
individual showing of standing [in order to
obtain relief], because the standing issue focuses
on whether the plaintiff is properly before the
court, not whether represented parties or absent
class members are properly before the court.
Whether or not the named plaintiff who meets
individual standing requirements may assert the
rights of absent class members is neither a
Id.
Id. at 385.
171 Id. at 393 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
172 Id. at 397.
173 Id. at 393.
174 Id. at 395.
169
170
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standing issue nor an Article III case or
controversy issue but depends rather on
meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23 governing
class actions.175
Justice Souter concluded that, under the majority’s view, for a
class plaintiff to establish standing, a court may be required to
examine the merits of a plaintiff’s complaint instead of merely
the allegations contained therein.176 This would be contrary to
traditional understandings of Article III standing
requirements.177
Finally, Justice Stevens wrote his opinion, where he
primarily dissented from the majority’s reasoning, although he
agreed with the decision to remand the case back to the district
court to modify the injunction.178 Justice Stevens’ primary
objection was that the majority was incorrect to narrow Bounds,
address standing, and address the district court’s decision to
certify the class action lawsuit because these issues were never
raised by petitioners.179 Thus, he was unable to join the
majority’s opinion.180

2. ANALYSIS
For some, Lewis v. Casey stands for the proposition that
the constitutional protections laid out in Bounds have been
drastically scaled back.181 This may be true, but the case also
has implications for standing and class-action lawsuits. To be
sure, Lewis is not a typical standing case: the majority’s decision
Id. (quoting 1 H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 2.07, pp. 2-40 to 2-41 (3d ed. 1992)).
176 Id. at 399.
177 Id. at 399-402.
178 See, e.g., David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2010)
(“In the wake
175

See, e.g., David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2010) (“In the wake of Casey, many prison
systems dramatically cut back on their law libraries; some eliminated
them entirely. . .”) (citing Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1633 n. 268 (2003)).
181
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to address standing—even though a trial had already
commenced, and even though petitioners never objected to
standing in the first place—should be treated as dicta because it
was not essential to the majority’s holding.182 However, Justice
Souter’s concurrence supports the proposition that the minority
rule—that putative unnamed class members need not establish
standing—is the correct rule.183
While the Lewis majority may have heightened the
requirements of standing when a plaintiff is asserting a Bounds
violation and denied standing to certain plaintiffs, the majority
never explicitly addressed the issue of unnamed class members
and standing.184
However, Justice Souter’s concurrence
expressly adopted the minority rule.185 In his concurrence,
Justice Souter stated that so long as the class representative of a
class action lawsuit has standing, a court need not determine
whether unnamed class members also have standing.186 Justice
Souter also agreed with the majority that at least two of the class
plaintiffs possessed standing to bring the suit.187 In sum, Justice
See Lewis, 518 U.S 343, 358; see also id. at 407 (Stevens, J.
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment). Dicta can be defined as “[a] judicial comment made
while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the
decision in the case and therefore not precedential.” Michael
Abramowicz, Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
959 (2005) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed. 2004)).
Nevertheless, this view is consistent with Justice Scalia’s approach to
standing. Compare Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358, with Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198-215 (2000)
(Scalia, J. dissenting).
183 In fact, the United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted that other circuits relied on Lewis when adhering to the
minority rule. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 800-01.
184 See generally id.
185 Compare Lewis, 518 U.S at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment), with Kohen, 571
F.3d at 676, and Neale, 794 F.3d at 363, and UFCW, 777 F.3d at 25.
186 Lewis, 518 U.S at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment) (quoting 1 H. NEWBERG & A.
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.07, pp. 2-40 to 2-41 (3d ed.
1992)).
187 Id. at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
182
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Souter’s concurrence is persuasive authority supporting the
notion that the minority rule is correct.188
ii. TYSON FOODS, INC. V. BOUAPHAKEO

1. BACKGROUND
In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,189 employees for Tyson
Foods, Inc., working at a processing plant, filed a class action
lawsuit against their employer.190 The employees claimed that
they were denied compensation for time spent changing in and
out of protective gear, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which requires employers to compensate their employees
for time spent on activities integral to their work.191 When the
case was initially filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa, Tyson Foods argued that “because of the
variance in protective gear each employee wore, the employees’
claims were not sufficiently similar to be resolved on a
classwide basis.”192
The district court rejected Tyson’s
argument and certified the class.193
The case ultimately went to trial.194 In order to recover
unpaid wages under the FLSA, the employees needed to show
that they each worked over 40 hours per week, including time
spent changing in and out of protective gear.195 However,
because Tyson did not maintain records of these times,
“representative evidence” was used by the parties at trial.196
First, an “industrial relations expert” proffered an estimate of
average time spent by employees changing in and out of

See id. at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting 1 H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.07, pp. 2-40 to 2-41 (3d ed. 1992)).
189 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
190 Id. at 1042.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 1043.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1043.
195 Id.
196 Id.
188
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protective gear.197 Second, the employees’ expert witness used
the industrial relations expert’s estimate to come up with
specific estimates as to the “amount of uncompensated work
each employee did . . . .”198 With this estimate, the employees’
expert asked the jury for almost $7 million in unpaid wages.199
A jury found that the time employees spent changing
gear was compensable time.200 The jury awarded almost $3
million in unpaid wages to the workers, roughly half the
amount the employees’ expert witness testified the employees
were owed.201 Tyson moved for judgment notwithstanding the
jury verdict.202 The Northern District of Ohio overruled Tyson’s
motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.203 The Supreme Court granted Tyson’s petition for
writ of certiorari.204 Tyson argued, inter alia, that the district
court’s decision to certify plaintiff’s class was improper because
some members of the class suffered no injuries.205 Tyson also
took issue with the fact that uninjured class members could
receive compensation under the substantial jury award.206
Justice Kennedy first addressed whether the class action
was properly certified under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), which requires
common questions of fact or law to “predominate” over
individual questions.207
The Court noted that “‘the
predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently
cohesive
to
warrant
adjudication
by
representation.’”208 The ultimate issue in Tyson was whether
“representative” or statistical evidence—used in the case by the
employees’ expert witnesses to provide estimates of (1) the
Id.
Id. at 1043-44.
199 Id. at 1044.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 1041.
205 See Pet. for Writ of Cert, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 2015
WL 1285369, at *i (Mar. 19, 2015).
206 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049.
207 Id. at 1045 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
208 Id. (quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623
(1997)).
197
198
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average time spent by employees changing in and out of
protective gear and (2) uncompensated time spent by each
employee working—was admissible in class action lawsuits.209
Tyson requested a broad rule prohibiting such
representative evidence to be used in class action suits.210 Tyson
contended that “[r]eliance on a representative sample . . .
absolves each employee of the responsibility to prove personal
injury, and thus deprives [Tyson] of any ability to litigate its
defenses to individual claims.”211 Thus, Tyson argued that the
“predominance” test was not met, and the district court
improperly certified the employees’ class.212 The Court
disagreed.213 The Court explained that the admissibility of such
evidence should not depend on whether the case is an
individual or class action lawsuit; rather, admissibility of
representative evidence—like any evidence—is dependent on
its relevance and reliability.214
Next, the Court declined to address Tyson’s standing
argument because Tyson conceded this point when the case
reached the Supreme Court.215 Instead, the Court addressed
Tyson’s new argument that the employees needed to provide a
way of preventing uninjured class members from receiving
money damages.216 The Court agreed with Tyson that
uninjured class members would have no legal right to damages;
however, the damages award had not yet been disbursed.217
Thus, the district court would be able to review the award on
remand.218
Chief Justice Roberts, with Justice Alito, joined the
majority opinion in full, concurring only to express concern
regarding the district court’s ability – upon remand – “to
fashion a method for awarding damages only to those class

Id. at 1046.
Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1049.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
209
210
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members who suffered an actual injury.”219 First, it was
undisputed that many members of the class did not suffer an
injury in the case at all.220 Second, the jury awarded the
employees a lump-sum damages award “without specifying
any particular amount of donning and doffing time used to
calculate that number.”221 Thus, instead of rendering the jury
award invalid—as requested by Tyson—Chief Justice Roberts
explained that the best course of action would be to leave the
jury award intact, but to remand to the district court to find a
way to disburse the award without awarding uninjured class
members.222 In short, “Article III does not give federal courts
the power to order relief to any uninjured plaintiff, class action
or not.”223 Finally, Justice Thomas dissented from the majority
opinion.224 Justice Thomas explained that the majority should
have reversed the district court’s order certifying the
employees’ class because the predominance factor was not
met.225 Justice Thomas was primarily concerned with the
Court’s decision to allow the use of representative evidence.226

2. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court is more likely to grant petitions for
writ of certiorari when the federal circuits are split on an
important matter.227 In Tyson, many expected the Supreme
Court to resolve the split over whether absent class members
need to establish standing before class certification.228 As noted
Id. at 1050 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
Id. at 1051 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
221 Id. (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
222 Id. at 1052-53 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
223 Id. at 1053 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
224 Id. at 1056-61 (Thomas,, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 1056-61 (Thomas,, J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 1056-61 (Thomas,, J., dissenting).
227 See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).
228 See, e.g. Theane Evangelis and Cynthia E. Richman, The Need to
Establish Absent Class Member Standing, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE,
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/EvangelisRichman-The-Need-to-Establish-Absent-Class-Member-StandingABA-Oct-2015.pdf (Oct. 2015); Christopher J. Michie, Absent Class
Members and Constitutional Standing, LAW360,
219
220
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by the Third Circuit in Neal, the second question presented for
review in Tyson was “[w]hether a class action may be certified
or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action
certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
when the class contains hundreds of members who were not
injured and have no legal right to any damages.”229
Unfortunately, however, Tyson—the petitioner—abandoned
this point, conceding that “[t]he fact that federal courts lack
authority to compensate persons who cannot prove injury does
not mean that a class action (or collective action) can never be
certified in the absence of proof that all class members were
injured.”230 Because of this concession, the Court declined to
consider the issue.231
Nevertheless, the Court’s decision not to address the
issue of standing suggests that absent class members need not
establish standing before class certification.232 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that it has an obligation to address
standing—even if the issue was not raised by the parties—if the
lower court possessed no jurisdiction over the case.233 This is
because:
‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at
all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of
announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 7 Wall. 506, 514,
19 L. Ed. 264 (1869). ‘On every writ of error or
appeal, the first and fundamental question is
that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then
https://www.law360.com/articles/683755/absent-class-membersand-constitutional-standing#_ednref44 (July 27, 2015).
229 Neale, 794 F.3d at 360, n. 2, (quoting Pet. for Writ of Cert, Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 2015 WL 1285369, at *i (Mar. 19, 2015)).
230 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 49).
231 Id. at 1049 (“In light of petitioner’s abandonment of its argument
from the petition, the Court need not, and does not, address it.”)
232 See id.
233 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110
(2001) (“We are obliged to examine standing sua sponte where
standing has erroneously been assumed below.”) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998)).
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of the court from which the record comes. This
question the court is bound to ask and answer
for itself, even when not otherwise suggested,
and without respect to the relation of the parties
to it.’ Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.
Jones, supra, 177 U.S. 449 at 453. The
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a
threshold matter springs from the nature and
limits of the judicial power of the United States"
and is inflexible and without exception.’
Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S.
379, 382, 28 L. Ed. 462, 4 S. Ct. 510 (1884).234
However, in Tyson, the majority did not address the issue of
standing, even though the petitioner raised the issue in its
petition for certiorari (although it eventually abandoned this
argument at the Supreme Court).235 Furthermore, in his
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that
hundreds of class members did not suffer any injury yet
declined to address standing.236 Because of its obligation to
correct standing issues, the Court’s decision in Tyson not to
address standing sua sponte suggests that there was never any
real standing issue to correct in the first place.237 In other words,
the decision suggests that unnamed putative class members
need not establish standing—the minority rule. A contrary
conclusion necessarily requires an invalidation of the holding
in Tyson due to lack of jurisdiction.238

B. THE MINORITY RULE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE
OF CLASS ACTION SUITS
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998).
Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049.
236 Id. at 1051 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
237 Compare id., at 1049, with Adarand Constructors, Inc., 534 U.S. at
110, and Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95.
238 See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 (“Without jurisdiction the
court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”) (quoting Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L. Ed. 264 (1869)). But see
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (examining Establishment Clause
challenges to tax credits that the Court had decided on the merits
before ruling in Winn that the plaintiffs lacked standing).
234
235
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“Judicial economy” is defined as “[e]fficiency in the
management of a particular litigation or of the courts in general;
refers to measures taken to avoid unnecessary effort or expense
on the part of the court or the court system.”239 Class action
lawsuits generally promote judicial economy by allowing a
single representative to sue on behalf of many similarly situated
individuals when it would be more efficient to do so.240 In
Califano v. Yamasaki,241 the Supreme Court explained that class
action lawsuits are “an exception to the usual rule that litigation
is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties
only.”242 “[T]he class-action device saves the resources of both
the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially
affecting every class member to be litigated in an economical
fashion under Rule 23.”243 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
aim to facilitate this purpose.244
The minority rule promotes judicial efficiency because it
is consistent with the nature of class action lawsuits. The
minority rule only requires class representatives to possess
standing.245 This is because “a class action is a representative
action brought by a named plaintiff or plaintiffs. Named
plaintiffs are the individuals who seek to invoke the court's
jurisdiction and they are held accountable for satisfying
jurisdiction.”246 In contrast, the majority rule, which prohibits
certification of classes containing members who lack standing,
hinders judicial efficiency.247 Indeed, the majority rule results
in exactly what Rule 23 aims to prevent: unnecessary
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http://www.yourdictionary.com/judicial-economy (last visited
April 3, 2017).
240 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
241 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
242 Califano, 442 U.S. at 700-701.
243 Id. at 700-701.
244 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
245 See, e.g., Kohen, 571 F.3d at 676; Neale, 794 F.3d at 363; UFCW, 777
F.3d at 25.
246 Neale, 794 F.3d at 363-64.
247 See, e.g., Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581;
Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252.
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prosecution of separate actions by individual class members.248
This is an inefficient use of judicial resources.249 As such, the
minority rule is necessary to effectuate the purpose of class
action lawsuits.

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the minority rule is compelled not only by
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lewis—where he
explicitly stated that only a class representative needs to
demonstrate standing—but also by the Court’s opinion in
Tyson.250 The Court’s decision in Tyson not to address the issue
of whether a class can be certified when absent class members
lack standing—even though this issue was raised by the
petitioner and the Court has repeatedly held that it has an
obligation to address standing—suggests that only named
plaintiffs need establish standing.251 Both of these opinions,
examined in light of the nature of class action suits, support the
minority rule.252 Finally, the minority rule also serves the
purpose of class action devices, since it promotes judicial
efficiency.253
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